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Abstract
This article is aimed at exploring China’s development process and Sino-Japanese 
economic relations in terms of the Akamatsu flying geese pattern (FGP) theory. 
On the basis of dynamic comparative advantage, the theory predicts that China’s 
trade advantage lies primarily in labor-intensive products and industries. However, 
the trade pattern has shifted relatively from such products to more capital-/
technology-intensive ones. The article tests the changes in China’s comparative 
advantage utilizing the RCA index, International Competitiveness coefficient 
and trade similarity index. It concludes that China’s development path and Sino-
Japanese economic relationships cannot be explained by the FGP theory alone, 
though the theory is still basically adaptable to the Chinese scene; deviations 
from that theory could be derived from various functions of FDIs, particularly 
importation of new technologies, that China has extensively enjoyed.
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Introduction
China, of an economic scale merely one fourth of Japan’s in 2000, caught up with 
and then surpassed Japan in 2010. The very structure of the Chinese economy 
underwent significant transformations, and in terms of Japan and China’s 
economic relationships, it appears that the conventional scheme of Japan as 
an advanced country and China as a developing country has begun to change. 
Here, the ways in which the economic relationship between the two countries 
has proceeded from the end of the 1980s to the present day will be examined 
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in the limited aspects of trade and investment. Until now, the Japanese and 
Chinese economies have been viewed not as being substitutes but as being in a 
complementary relationship; the problem pursued in this paper is whether it is 
possible to apprehend the current and future Sino-Japanese economic relationship 
solely through such a framework or viewpoint.
This paper comprises the following. Section One will provide an overview 
of the flying geese pattern (FGP) theory, which has served as the basis of 
conventional arguments, as well as a theory on the stages of economic 
development in the form of a catch-up industrialization theory. Based on several 
studies, Section Two will consider whether or not the FGP theory can sufficiently 
explain China’s economic development. Next, the progression of the Sino-
Japanese economic relationship will be viewed from both trade and investment 
perspectives in Section Three, and Section Four will determine whether Sino-
Japanese trade is in a subsutitute or in a complementary relationship using a 
measure called the export similarity index. In Section Five, it will be asserted 
that although Japan and China are in a unidirectional relationship in terms of 
investment and technology, there is no way this relationship will continue in 
all fields and area in the future. Finally, the article will conclude that the Sino-
Japanese economic relationship is shifting from a complementary to a competitive 
complementary relationship. 
1. The Flying Geese Pattern Theory and the Theory 
    of Catch-up Industrialization1
China has enjoyed over 30 years of remarkable economic growth and development 
since its economic reform. Numerous methods for organizing and describing this 
kind of development pattern have been prepared, but perhaps the quickest method 
is to use existing development models as a frame of reference. For example, 
describing China’s development pattern and stage of development around Arthur 
Lewis’s dualism has been done, and Petty-Clark’s law has been used to discuss 
changes in China’s industrial structure. These are both models and hypotheses of 
stage theories, and they attempt to determine and analyze the trends up to now and 
the current state of China based on a kind of international reference of the stages a 
country passes through in the process of economic development.
However, the most stimulating model among the many theories of stages of 
economic development would probably be the flying geese pattern theory. This 
model, created by Kaname Akamatsu and developed by Kiyoshi Kojima, links a 
1 The following two sessions are a summary of Nakagane (2012) Chapter 5.
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theory of comparative advantage as well as the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which 
are the most fundamental propositions in international trade theory, with a theory 
of capital accumulation, and dynamically develops their arguments. This theory 
changed in appearance and developed into the Fei-Ohkawa-Ranis phase transition 
theory of economic development.2 
There are three patterns in the flying geese pattern theory. One is the 
dynamic, sequential development process relating to production and trades 
that is importing → domestic production → exporting. Akamatsu called this 
the fundamental type of the flying geese pattern. When a developing country 
attempts to start developing, it cannot produce modern goods domestically, and 
so it must import them. However, when imports increase and domestic demand 
is satisfied, the technology of those goods is introduced into the country, and 
enterprises (entrepreneurs) that also wish to enter the market arise and enter 
domestic production of those goods. As domestic production grows and comes to 
satisfy domestic demand, imports begin to dwindle, and when production capacity 
expands enough to have reserves, exports begin. To put it another way, the 
comparative advantage structure of that country changes over that period. Here, 
let us call this type of dynamic change in the comparative advantage structure the 
first type of the flying geese pattern.
Another phase of development is the change in the comparative advantage 
structure from more labor-intensive goods to more capital-intensive goods, or 
from consumer goods to producer goods. Capital becomes relatively abundant 
in a developing country that began accumulating capital during the development 
process in the first type of FGP model. Here, the country gradually starts to gain 
a relative comparative advantage for capital-intensive goods for which there 
initially was absolutely no comparative advantage. As a result, these goods 
progressively come to be produced domestically, resulting in export capacity. 
Thus, a development pattern like the first is eventually exhibited with respect 
to capital-intensive goods as well. If a country has a comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive goods, it comes to have a comparative disadvantage in labor-
intensive goods, leading to a progressive decrease in the production and export 
of the latter, which gives way to production and export of the former. A dynamic 
structural change in production and export goods incorporating this kind of shift 
in industrial structure represents the second type of the flying geese pattern. 
Based on the development experience of East Asian countries, Fei et al. state 
that economic development proceeds through the following sort of process. In 
2 John Fei, Kazushi Ohkawa and Gustav Ranis, “Keizai hatten no rekishiteki pasupekutibu: 
Nihon, Kankoku, Taiwan” [Economic Development in Historical Perspective: Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan], in Kazushi Ohkawa, ed., Japan and Developing Countries (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 
1986).
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the first phase of economic development, when modern consumer goods are 
imported, domestic production is stimulated and starts, leading to primary import 
substitution, or the substitution of domestic production for imports. Next, a second 
phase of primary export substitution arises, in which export goods shift from 
conventional, traditional products to modern consumer goods. In the third phase, 
when there is importation of producer goods, domestic production steps into its 
place and secondary import substitution proceeds. If this continues, the phase of 
secondary export substitution arises in which the export products, once consumer 
goods, are substituted by producer goods. In the above phases, modern technology 
was entirely imported from abroad, but in the fourth phase, self-development 
of technology begins and secondary import and secondary export substitution 
continue to develop with the new locally-developed technology. This transition of 
phases truly parallels the first and second type of the FGP theory using the notions 
of import and export substitution.
 If development in the style of the flying geese pattern applies to all countries, 
when one advanced country A has a comparative advantage for capital-intensive 
goods, a less-advanced country B that has a trade relationship with country A 
would have a comparative advantage for labor-intensive goods. After more time 
passes and the less-advanced country B chases A to have a comparative advantage 
in capital-intensive goods, advanced country A would come to have a comparative 
advantage for goods that are still more capital intensive, while a less-advanced 
country C that is further behind country B would now come to have a comparative 
advantage for labor-intensive goods. This billiard-ball phenomenon that arises in 
accordance with the development stage of countries shall be called the third type 
of the flying geese pattern. Normally, the development process in the style of the 
flying geese pattern in Asia refers to this third type of the flying geese pattern. For 
example, what is often called the flying geese pattern is the successive process of 
economic development with Japan as the leading goose, followed by the NIEs, 
then ASEAN, and finally China chasing from behind.3 This pattern is theoretically 
derived from the first and second types of the FGP theory. As will be noted later, 
the theory of “catch-up” industrialization relating to economic development can, 
separately from the intentions of its creator, be considered to be fundamentally 
based on this third type of flying geese pattern. As Fei et al. state, Japan has 
experienced all of these phase transitions of theirs, behind which Taiwan and 
South Korea have also been developing via these transitional phases. In other 
words, their model suggests that the third type of the flying geese pattern is valid 
by these countries.
Afterwards, Akamatsu’s FGP theory was refined and developed by Kiyoshi 
3 Toshio Watanabe called this the “telescoping catch-up process.” See Watanabe (1985).
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Kojima. In particular, we should pay attention to the fact that Kojima incorporated 
foreign direct investment (FDI), largely ignored during the Akamatsu period, 
into this model. In the phase of the first type, domestic accumulation of capital 
and the introduction of technology by domestic enterprises (or the government) 
play a central role in Akamatsu’s model. The same is applicable to the phase of 
the second type. Here, suppose that capital and technology are brought in from 
abroad by foreign companies. As a result, in the first type, the import phase is 
skipped and from the beginning, domestic production and furthermore exports 
become possible. In the second type, the stage of producing labor-intensive goods 
or consumer goods is skipped, and from the beginning, production of capital-
intensive goods or producer goods and furthermore exports becomes possible. 
Thus, when FDI enters a framework like the FGP theory, theoretically and 
practically speaking there is the possibility of the basic framework itself falling 
apart. Naturally, this would also affect the model of the third type, as “leap-
frogging” development becomes possible. 
Kojima seems to have believed that FDI reinforces and complements 
Akamatsu’s FGP theory. He classified FDI into two types, one which is pro-
trade oriented, and the other which is anti-trade oriented. He called the former 
“Japanese-style,” and the latter, “US-style” direct investment. Pro-trade oriented 
FDI is the investment in industries that have a comparative disadvantage in the 
receiving country (host country), corresponding to its factor endowment. In this 
process, superior administrative resources shift from the investing country to the 
receiving country, the efficiency of the industry with a comparative advantage 
in the receiving country is improved, and more profitable trade expands. In the 
phase of the first type of FGP model, domestic production becomes more active 
by receiving investment from abroad, export power further expands, and trade 
is promoted. On the other hand, anti-trade oriented FDI is characterized by the 
investment by industries with a comparative advantage in the investing country 
in industries, not corresponding to the factor endowment of the receiving country 
(e.g., investment of a sort that is for building capital-intensive factories in a 
developing country with an abundance of labor). This type of investment does not 
result in expansion of that developing country’s exports.4
With perhaps a greater impact on international economics than the FGP theory 
was Vernon’s product cycle theory.5 According to Vernon, products produced and 
4 Kiyoshi Kojima, “Gankou-gata keizai hattenron” [FGP-type Economic Development 
Theory], in Makoto Ikema, ed., Kokusai keizai no shinkozu: Gankou-gata keizai hatten no shit-
en kara [New Perspectives of International Economies: From the View of FGP-type Economic 
Development] (Tokyo: Bunshindo, 2009).
5 Raymond Vernon, “International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 20 (1966), pp. 190-207.
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exported under a technological revolution in an advanced country progressively 
become obsolete, and their production and export shift to countries that are less 
developed than the advanced country. Then, a new technological revolution 
occurs in the advanced country, and new products are created that come to be 
produced and exported. It was Akira Suehiro who incorporated these arguments, 
as well as the FGP theory of Akamatsu and others, to develop the theory of catch-
up industrialization.6 He depicts producing/exporting countries shifting in tandem 
with technological revolutions in a simple model (see Figure 1). First, if a new 
product A is created in the US, that technology would eventually be conveyed 
to Japan and the two countries would compete with each other with respect to 
product A. Eventually the US will lose its comparative advantage for that product 
and develop a new, more sophisticated product B. The technology for product 
A would then be conveyed to the NIEs such as South Korea or Taiwan, and 
this time Japan would lose its competitive power for that product, with a new 
comparative advantage in the production and export of product B vis-à-vis the 
US. Thus, in Japan, the comparative advantage for product A would give way to 
that for product B, and in the US the way to produce and export an even more 
sophisticated product C would be found. Similarly, product D (not shown in the 
figure), E, F, etc., would be created in the US, be transmitted to Japan, and the 
country of production and export would shift to the NIEs, ASEAN, and finally 
to country X (for example, China), filled below by ASEAN. It can be said that 
this process—continual product sophistication, transfer of technology, shifts in 
the comparative advantage structure, and catch-up of less-advanced countries to 
advanced countries—represents the second and third type of development in the 
style of the flying geese pattern as seen above.
Of course, models differ from reality, and in the real world not all new 
technology is born in the US; there should be cases in which Japan is the starting 
point. Also, it is not as though all technology flows cleanly from high-income 
to low-income countries, nor does the country of production transfer in such 
a fashion. Suehiro himself comments on the limitations of his model. What is 
important is to ask about the extent to which these models are valid when applied 
to China in the real world as a frame of reference, and, if there are areas that resist 
explanation using these models, to determine why that is the case. By doing so, it 
will no doubt be possible to apprehend the par-ticularities of the Chinese economy 
and its development.
6 Akira Suehiro, Kyattchi-appu-gata kogyokaron: Ajia keizai no kiseki to tenbo [Catch-
up Industrialization: The Trajectory and Prospects of Asian Economies] (Nagoya: Nagoya 
University Press, 2000).
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Figure 1: Technological Innovations and Movement of Producing and Exporting 
Countries
Source: Suehiro (2000), p. 51, Figure 2-4B
2. Chinese Economic Development and the Flying Geese 
    Pattern Theory
Has China followed a development pattern like that described by the FGP theory? 
Alternatively, is it possible to sufficiently depict or explain the pattern of Chinese 
development using this theory? To answer these questions, it is important to 
consider a number of major goods and to illustrate their development patterns, 
as Akamatsu did. In that case, however, the selection of goods becomes an issue. 
In order to determine whether or not the economy has overall been developing 
in such a manner as shown by this theory, it is easier to investigate China’s trade 
patterns and to observe changes in the comparative advantage structure. In other 
words, as stated above, development in the manner of the flying geese pattern 
represents dynamic changes in the comparative advantage structure, and so in 
order for a country’s economic development to fit the FGP model, the trade 
and domestic production of that country must, as a prerequisite, be based on a 
comparative advantage.
The simplest methods for investigating the comparative advantage structure 
of a country are to measure the specialization coefficient (or the international 
competitiveness (IC) coefficient) or Balassa’s revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) index. If a country’s trade is conducted based on the principle of 
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comparative advantage, it is expected that more of the goods for which the 
country has a comparative advantage would be exported, while more of the goods 
for which there is a comparative disadvantage would be imported. Thus, we may 
be able to see the comparative advantage structure of the country through the 
relative quantity of exports. Let us, then, look at China's IC and RCA coefficients 
as well as their movements .7
First, Kong8 provides an example of calculating and observing the movement of 
the IC and/or RCA of China at a very broad classification. By simply classifying 
SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) 6 and SITC 8 as labor-
intensive goods and SITC 5 and SITC 7 as capital-/technology-intensive goods, 
she calculated the IC coefficients and RCA indexes from 1995 to 2004. As a 
result, while China’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods continued 
to be seen in its exports, it was understood that the level of advantage of goods 
in SITC 8 started to drop in 1997; meanwhile, although the level of advantage of 
goods in SITC 6 among the capital-intensive goods continued to be low, China 
clearly came to have a comparative advantage in SITC 8 goods after 2003 and 
was especially internationally competitive for goods including machinery and 
transportation facilities.9
However, classification based on the one-digit SITC number is too broad to 
accurately apprehend the characteristics of the goods. Thus, Yang and Zhu went 
down to the three-digit SITC and classified products into four types: resource 
intensive, labor intensive, capital intensive, and technology intensive. They then 
investigated the trends in China’s international competitiveness based on the RCA 
index, IC coefficient, export structure and the like from the period of “reform and 
openness” until 2006, obtaining the following results.10 Namely, in the beginning, 
7 If we take the exportation of product i of Country J as Xij, and importation as Mij, then the 
specialization coefficient, or international competitiveness coefficient, can be expressed as 
(Xij—Mij) / (Xij+Mij). When we consider the world as a whole, with the world’s exportation 
of product i represented by Wi, where W represents the entire world’s exports, the RCA 
coefficient can be expressed as (Xij/Xj) / (Wi/W). While both of these formulas are understood 
to be measurements of the level of comparative advantage for product i in country j, they 
do not measure “comparative production cost” and thus should be used merely as proxies of 
comparative advantage. Needless to say, all trade is assumed to occur under the assumption 
that the principles of comparative advantage are being followed, and should that assumption 
be abandoned, these coefficients and indexes may not accurately represent comparative 
advantage.
8 Jiongjiong Kong, “Woguo gongye zhichengpinde guoji jingzhengli fenxi” [Analysis of 
International Competitiveness of Our Industrial Products], Tongjiyu Juece, 2 (2007), pp. 59-61.
9 This fact is supported by the findings of Li and Qing (2007) in a comparison of China’s 
export competitiveness in 1995 and 2004. Further, Shen and Gu (2007) calculated China’s 
RCA achieved through Sino-US trade between 1995 and 2006, indicating that China came to 
gain a comparative advantage in SITC 6 goods from 2004 on. 
10 Rudai Yang and Shie Zhu, “Zhongguo duiwai maoyi jiegouyu jingzhengli yanjiu: 
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China had an advantage for resource-intensive and labor-intensive products, but 
progressively came to have a comparative advantage for capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive products. Meanwhile, resource-intensive products became 
comparatively disadvantageous, and along with labor-intensive products, although 
at a somewhat lower level, capital-intensive products and technology-intensive 
products came to maintain a corresponding advantage (see Table 1). To generalize, 
this study suggests that although China continues to have a comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive goods, it has started to have thorough international 
competitiveness in at least a portion of capital- and technology-intensive goods.
  Type of  
  products 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
  Resource
  intensive 0.21 0.47 0.31 0.04 -0.16 -0.32
  Labor
  intensive 0.4 0.55 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.67
  Capital   
  intensive -0.63 0 -0.25 -0.14 0.04 0.08
  Technology 
  intensive -0.47 -0.49 -0.03 0.18 0.18 0.17
Table 1: International Competitiveness Coefficients of China's Trade, 1980-2006
Source: Rudai Yang and Shie Zhu, “Zhongguo duiwai maoyi jiegou yu jingzhengli 
yanjiu: 1978-2006” [Study on Structure and Competitiveness of China’s External 
Trade: 1978-2006], Caimao Jingji, 2 (2008), pp. 112-119.
How, then, did China come to have a comparative advantage in capital- and 
technology-intensive goods? One key to unlocking the answer to this is the 
development of intra-industry trade. For example, if China handles a portion of 
the production process for certain advanced countries (countries with abundant 
technology and capital) and exports those goods to them, it would be exporting 
China’s capital-/technology-intensive goods. This is a result of so-called 
fragmentation of industrial production by the developed economies. Alternatively, 
if China imports capital-/technology-intensive goods as components from 
advanced countries’ processes or assembles the components in China before 
exporting them overseas, this would also constitute an exportation of capital-/
technology-intensive goods. As is well known, processing trade makes up an 
extremely large fraction of China’s trade.
If the export similarity index11 is calculated, China’s export structure in 2000 
1978-2006” [Study on Structure and Competitiveness of China's External Trade: 1978-2006], 
Caimao Jingji, 2 (2008), pp. 112-119.
11 This index is calculated as follows. If the export ratio of product p in two countries (regions) 
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was more similar to those of South Korea and Taiwan in 1990 than to that of 
ASEAN in the same year.12 In other words, when seen in terms of trade structure, 
China, which is still at a low level of development with respect to per capita 
income, has “leap-frogged” over ASEAN and is approaching South Korea and 
Taiwan. A similar conclusion was derived by Schott (see Table 2). At least 
according to this indicator, China was a “normal developing country” in 1983, but 
approached the NIEs such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in 1994, and 
became nearly equivalent to the NIEs in 2005.13
1983 1994 2005
Mexico 0.20 Mexico 0.28 Korea 0.33
Korea 0.18 Korea 0.25 Mexico 0.33
Taiwan 0.17 Taiwan 0.22 Taiwan 0.22
Israel 0.16 Brazil 0.19 China 0.21
Brazil 0.16 Hong Kong 0.17 Brazil 0.20
Hong Kong 0.13 Singapore 0.16 Poland 0.17
Singapore 0.13 China 0.15 Israel 0.17
Argentina 0.09 Malaysia 0.15 India 0.16
Yugoslavia 0.09 Israel 0.14 Singapore 0.15
Hungary 0.08 Thailand 0.14 Hong Kong 0.15
Poland 0.08 Argentina 0.09 Thailand 0.15
Saudi Arabia 0.08 Poland 0.09 Argentina 0.13
China 0.08 India 0.09 Hungary 0.13
       
        Table 2: Countries with High Export Similarity Indexes with the OECD
Note: For export similarity indexes, refer to note 11 of the text.
Source: Peter Schott, “The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports,” Economic Policy 
(2008), pp. 5-49; Table 12. 
It has been verified that with regard to a subset of products, China has departed 
from the third type of FGP development and caught up with and even surpassed 
a number of countries that had been ahead. For example, Tung used global trade 
statistics to calculate the RCA indexes and IC coefficients for trade in electronics 
for Japan, the NIEs, ASEAN and China for the period 1970-1998, and although 
c & d in year t are sstp and s
d
tp, then the export similarity index (ESI) = Σp min(s
s
tp , s
d
tp). Here, 
if c is China and d represents OECD countries, we can measure the level of similarity between 
China and OECD’s export structures, use OECD as a standard to calculate ESI for other 
countries or regions, and upon comparison with China also find the level of similarity between 
China and other countries and regions.
12 Sanjaya Lall and M. Albaladejo, “China's Competitive Performance: A Threat to East Asian 
Manufactured Exports?” World Development, 32 (2004), pp. 1441-66.
13  A similar conclusion is reached in Yang and Zhu (2008).
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China is indeed chasing behind ASEAN by aggregate amount, it has surpassed 
ASEAN with respect to individual products.14 Hiratsuka15 has also noted this fact. 
By contrast, there is also the view that even today when China’s IT trade has 
made progress, it still plays second fiddle to ASEAN; in other words, the FGP 
theory does apply to China after all. For example, Ginzburg and Simonazzi16 
were inspired by Tung, but using a different database have asserted that this 
theory does hold in East Asia with respect to the electronics industry.17 Kwan18 
calculated the IC coefficient and RCA index for international trade goods 
imported by the US from each country in Asia, and although the comparative 
advantage of intellectual-/capital-intensive industries in China did increase in 
2000 compared to 1990, when calculating the trade sophistication index of Lall 
et al., it was discovered that China has a comparative advantage over ASEAN in 
labor-intensive goods; thus, it has been asserted that the FGP theory is still valid 
for China.19 Also following Kwan’s methods, Zhu and Teramachi extended the 
investigated time period to 2006, comparing the IC and RCA of goods imported 
by the US as well as the level of competition by country. While basically 
supporting Kwan’s discoveries and assertions, they noted that China’s exports to 
the US have been growing competitively with those from Japan.20 From this point 
14 An-chi Tung, “Beyond Flying Geese: The Expansion of East Asia's Electronics Trade,” 
German Economic Review, 4 (2003), pp. 35-51.
15 Daisuke Hiratsuka, “Competitiveness of ASEAN, China and Japan,” in Ippei Yamazawa 
and Daisuke Hiratsuka, eds., ASEAN-Japan Competitive Strategy (Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2003).
16 Andrea Ginzburg and Annamaria Simonazzi, “Patterns of Industrialization and the Flying 
Geese Model: The Case of Electronics in East Asia,” Journal of Asian Economics, 15 (2005), 
pp. 1051-1078.
17 While they also calculated the RCA index for the electronics industry and individual 
products, they differed in that they used tons as a measure of comparison, focusing not on the 
world as a whole but on East Asia and America. While the movement of RCA was nearly the 
same using tons, the interpretation was quite different.
18 Chihung Kwan, “Chugoku no taito to IT kakumei no shinko de ganko keitairon wa ku-
zuretaka: Beikoku shijo ni okeru Chugoku seihin no kyosoryoku niyoru kensho” [Has the 
Flying Geese Pattern Collapsed as a Result of China’s Rise and IT Revolution? Inspection of 
Competitiveness of Chinese Products in the US Market], RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 02-J-
006 (2002).
19 Lall’s trade sophistication index is represented as Sli = Σ(Xik/Xiw)*Yk. Here, Xik is the 
volume of export of product i from country k, Xiw is the volume of export of that product on 
the international level, and Yk is the level of income of country k. Kwan (2002) termed this so-
phistication index the “value-added indicator” (Lall et al. 2005). But Kwan’s target of analysis 
is limited to exports to the US, and it is necessary to be aware that there may be fluctuation in 
the RCA index and other such measures between countries. For example, Tung (2003) discov-
ered that differences between these indices arise upon separating international trade from trade 
with Japan.
20 Lifeng Zhu and Nobuo Teramachi, “Nicchukan ASEAN no taibei yushutsukozo no hikaku: 
Kan shiyu ronbun no kakucho” [Comparison of US Export Structure among Japan, China, 
Korea and ASEAN: An Extension of Kwan's Paper], Kyoto Sangyo University Discussion 
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of view, as Hiratsuka notes, it is quite possible to say that “[with respect to China,] 
the flying geese pattern theory has partially collapsed.”21
These facts imply the following. First, China rapidly attained capital ac-
cumulation as well as technological development and has started to compete 
with advanced countries in terms of trade. China has an enormous population 
with an abundance of labor, and the era of using low wages as a weapon to gain 
comparative advantage solely for labor-intensive products is becoming a thing 
of the past. Second, nevertheless, China does not have an advantage only in 
capital-and technology-intensive goods in the manner of an advanced country, 
but continues to show its strength in labor-intensive products. From these facts, 
it seems that it is not appropriate to view China as a (relatively) low-income 
country by measuring only per capital income. China has a broader area and larger 
population than the EU, and similarly has an abundance of diversity. Altogether, 
China contains “advanced countries” like Shanghai, “middle income countries” 
like Henan Province and Hebei Province, and “poor countries” like Guizhou 
Province, and so it is a mistake to measure the factor endowment status of China 
as a whole solely through the average income level or capital labor ratio. Third, 
one factor that caused and is in fact one of the most powerful factors behind this 
diversity has been the presence of FDI from abroad. It is because of FDI that 
capital could be accumulated more easily and new technology introduced so 
rapidly.
When this happened, the FDI that China received was certainly not just pro-
trade in Kojima’s sense of the term. There were many cases of FDI in capital-
intensive and technology-intensive industries, such as the automobile and 
semiconductors industries, that were thus anti-trade with respect to China’s factor 
endowment. This is because foreign capital was not necessarily invested in China 
solely because of its low cost of labor. One of the factors behind capital-intensive 
industries entering China in force was due to an agglomeration of industries which 
would beckon to such industries that had already formed in China, and because a 
portion of the processes from the advanced countries had shifted to China in order 
for foreign capital to evince the process fragmentation effect. Also significant 
is the FDI inducing effect of the domestic market, which has been expanding in 
China.
The mechanism operating in China, with its large population and high ability 
to achieve quantitative expansion of the domestic market, was such that its 
economy’s expanding market drew in much foreign capital, which then brought 
Paper Series, 2010-01 (February 2010).
21 Daisuke Hiratsuka, “Competitiveness of ASEAN, China and Japan,” in Ippei Yamazawa 
and Daisuke Hiratsuka, eds., ASEAN-Japan Competitive Strategy (Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2003).
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along advanced technology that, with the spillover effect, greatly improved 
China’s level of technology and thus resulted in an even greater ability to grow. 
This mechanism was one powerful factor behind China’s new development 
pattern, one that would leapfrog FGP development.
3. Trends of the Sino-Japanese Economic Relationship
Against the above backdrop, let us now examine the characteristics of China’s 
international economic relations and economic development focusing on the 
Sino-Japanese economic relationship (rather than taking a general look at China’s 
external economic relationships). Here, as preparation for the arguments in the 
next section, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship and its trends since China’s 
“reform and openness” will be examined solely from the point of view of trade 
and investment.
It must be stressed here that our analysis focuses on the situation until 2010 
when the Sino-Japanese economic relationship was quite normal. After 2012, 
when the Senkaku islands issue occurred, a new and irregular relationship 
surrounding the two countries happened to take place, resulting in a dramatic drop 
in Sino-Japanese trade, which is beyond the scope of our studies in this article.
(1) Trade
To Japan and China, each country is an indispensable trade partner to the other, 
but this position has changed over time. First is an examination of China’s 
dependence on trade with Japan.
1981 1995 2000 2005 2010
Total trade 25.4 20.5 17.5 13.0 10.0
Export 22.1 19.1 16.7 11.0 7.7
Import 28.6 22.0 18.4 15.2 12.7
Table 3: China's Dependence on Trade with Japan (%)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1981, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the degree of dependence on trade with Japan 
constituted 25% of the overall value of trade, but this progressively decreased, 
falling to 10% in 2010. While this drop indeed marked a relative decrease in the 
importance of Japan as a trade partner, it actually indicates that as the Chinese 
economy has developed and expanded in scope, its trade partners have become 
more diverse. It goes without saying that the absolute value of trade with Japan 
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has continued to grow, and as will be discussed below, from a qualitative 
viewpoint the importance of Japanese trade has not at all declined. In 2010, 
China’s trade with Japan ranked just below trade with the US at the number two 
spot. From Table 3, it can be understood that China has consistently had a trade 
deficit with Japan until 2010. On the other hand, China has accrued a massive 
trade surplus with the West, particularly the US. The trade deficit with Japan is 
far smaller than the trade surplus with the US, and so the former is completely 
cancelled out by the latter.
Now, what proportion of Japan’s trade has been rerouted to China? Here, the 
proportion of trade with China until 2010 will be examined using Japanese trade 
statistics. 
1981 1995 2000 2005 2010
Total trade 3.5 7.4 10.0 17.0 20.7
Export 3.3 5.0 5.2 13.5 19.4
Import 3.7 10.7 13.2 21.0 22.1
Table 4: Japan's Dependence on Trade with China (%)
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance Trade statistics, 1981, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010.
Standing exactly opposite to the situation with China’s trade dependence on 
Japan, the proportion of trade with China has progressively increased, and starting 
in 2009, China passed the US to become Japan’s largest trade partner. In 2010, 
combined imports and exports rose to a level exceeding 20% of the total.22 There 
is no consistency at a glance between this and Table 3. Table 3 shows that Japan 
has a current account surplus with China, but by contrast it appears from Table 
4 as though Japan had a trade deficit with China. However, when Hong Kong is 
added as a partner in Japan’s trade with China, Japan nearly consistently tallied a 
trade surplus.
The above point indicates that relatively speaking, China’s trade importance to 
Japan has increased, and China’s market is becoming indispensable to Japan. In 
order to determine why this occurred, it is necessary to delve into the structure of 
Sino-Japanese trade23 (See Section 4 below).
(2) Direct Investment
Next, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship and its movements will be 
examined from the point of view of FDI. Here, too, both Chinese statistics and 
Japanese statistics (both have conceptual differences and do not match) are  used 
22 Including Hong Kong, China became the greatest trade partner in 2007.
23 The international input-output table can be useful if we want to know how Sino-Japanese 
trade has impacted on domestic industries in each country, but such a study remains to be seen. 
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primarily to investigate the relative importance of Japanese capital to China.
First, the share of Japanese capital (utilized) in China capital is much less 
than that is from Hong Kong. Even in 2010, it failed to exceed 4% of the overall 
amount of foreign capital received by China, and was less than 10% of Hong 
Kong capital. Of course, there was an investment boom by Japanese corporations 
in China in the mid-1990s and the first half of the 2000s, with many enterprises 
investing large quantities in China, but even then it remained below investment 
from Hong Kong24 (see Table 5).
1994 1995 1999 2000 2004 2005 2009 2010
Total 3394584 3780569 4031871 4071481 6062998 6032459 9003267 10573235
Hong 
Kong 1982268 2018511 1636305 1549998 1899830 1794879 4607547 6056677
Japan 208616 321247 297308 291585 545157 652977 410497 408372
% of  total 
Hong 
Kong 58.4 53.4 40.6 38.1 31.3 29.8 51.2 57.3
Japan 6.1 8.5 7.4 7.2 9.0 10.8 4.6 3.9
Table 5: Direct Investment in China by Region (10,000 US dollars and %)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1994~1995, 1999~2000, 2004~2005, 2009~2010.
External investment from China is rapidly expanding along with China’s 
economic development, but much of it is investment related to resources; for 
example, China has been investing large quantities with the aim of extracting 
as well as importing petroleum and natural gas from Africa and Central Asia. 
Although Chinese direct investment in Japan has increased little by little over the 
past 10 years, it is far less than Japan’s investment in China (See Table 6). 
Outward
Share of 
world total (%) Inward
Share of 
world total (%)
Total Manu-facturing Total
Manu-
facturing Total
Manu-
facturing Total
Manu-
facturing
Asia 199,941 127,973 26.7 35.7 20,689 2,826 11.8 4.6
China 64,677 48,017 8.6 13.4 435 209 0.2 0.3
USA 213,708 95,135 28.6 26.5 55,003 7,097 31.3 11.5
Europe 179,188 95,607 23.9 26.6 79,078 46,949 45.1 75.8
World 748,280 358,887 100.0 100.0 175,482 61,942 100.0 100.0
Table 6: Japan's Direct Investment by Region, end of 2011 (100 million yen)
24 If investment in China via Hong Kong, the total volume of Japanese investment in China 
may become much larager.
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Source: Bank of Japan Balance of Payment Statistics, at http://www.boj.or.jp/statistics/br/bop/ 
index.htm
Looking at the investment balance outstanding at the end of 2011, Japan’s 
investment in China is about 6.5 trillion yen, while China’s investment in Japan is 
43.5 billion yen, or a mere 0.7% of the previous figure. In other words, investment 
differs from trade in that it has not been a bidirectional relationship; rather, up to 
the present time, it has been a unidirectional relationship with Japan investing and 
China receiving.
In a sense this is quite natural. Since distance is an important determining 
factor in the case of trade: As indicated by the gravity model of trade, with other 
conditions being held constant, the value of trade increases with proximity. In 
the case of investment, however, funds do not have any weight: If there are 
resources, if there is a market, or if there is a need for production, then necessity 
outweighs distance. Moreover, the relationship between trade and investment is 
very different in China and in Japan. When investing in China, a structure exists 
wherein Japanese corporations move a portion of their production sites to China, 
exporting the intermediate products and final goods produced there to Japan. 
By contrast, there are many cases in which investment in Japan occurs through 
corporate acquisitions for Chinese companies to obtain technology owned by 
Japanese corporations, the aim of which is not the pure expansion of trade.
4. The Substituting/Complementary Relationship in 
Sino-Japanese Trade
It is frequently said that the Sino-Japanese trade relationship is not substituting, 
but complementary.25 Consequently, if Sino-Japanese trade is developed, a 
win-win relationship would develop rather than Chinese products driving out 
Japanese products in the Japanese or global market . Behind this argument lies the 
understanding that China’s economic development fits the form of the flying geese 
pattern, and that it is following a process of catch-up industrialization, as seen in 
Figure 1.
Therefore, in order to investigate whether Sino-Japanese trade is in fact 
complementary rather than competitive, the similarity index of the trade structures 
of both countries and its movements will first be examined. Here, a similarity 
index is calculated in a form slightly different from, but essentially same as that of 
Lall et al. above.26 As one possibility, it may be that if Chinese and Japanese trade 
25 Chihung Kwan, “Chugoku kyoiron ni igi ari” [Against the China Threat Argument] (2001), 
at http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/china-tr/jp/010910ntyu.htm.
26 More specifically, the export similarity index is defined as (ESI)=100−Σp | S
s
tp − S
d
tp |. 
Here, s represents the Sino-Japanese export structure (with shares of individual goods in 
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structures are very similar, they are very substituting/competitive, but if not, they 
are complementary. What has the similarity relationship been between Japanese 
and Chinese export structures from the beginning of the 1980s to the present day? 
(See Table 7)
1981 1985 1990 1995 2000
Foods 15.0 12.2 7.2 4.4 3.4
Textile 22.0 26.0 25.4 19.6 14.9
Pulp, paper, 
wood 7.3 5.0 7.7 10.1 7.6
Stone, clay, glass 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.0
Oil and gas 22.0 26.0 6.1 1.8 1.6
Iron and steel 5.6 4.4 1.9 0.5 0.9
Chemicals 1.3 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.4
General 
machinery 11.3 14.0 19.1 19.4 12.7
Electrical 
machinery 18.6 22.5 13.4 15.5 10.7
Household 
electric 
appliances
6.6 7.0 1.6 4.7 4.0
Precision 
machinery 2.3 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8
Transport 
equipment 25.9 24.9 23.0 17.5 17.8
Toys and 
Miscellaneous 
goods
1.3 4.1 12.2 15.3 14.7
Total 140.7 149.3 122.4 114.0 94.5
Similarity index 
(100-Total) -40.7 -49.3 -22.4 -14.0 5.5
Table 7: Similarity Index of Trade Structure between China and Japan (%) 
Note: For similarity index of trade structure, see footnote 26 of the text.
Source: Author’s calculation based on RIETI-TID 2011 data
It has already been noted that the level of similarity between OECD and 
Chinese exports has been progressively rising, but the table illustrates that in 
the relationship with Japan, a member of the OECD, the level of similarity with 
the Chinese export structure has risen rapidly since the start of this century. The 
primary products among China’s exports shifted from oil and gas, foods, and 
textiles, which are resource- and labor-intensive products, to general machinery, 
electrical machinery and household electrical appliances, or machine products. 
This change has been a major factor in the increase of the level of similarity 
between the export structures of Japan and China.
However, a high level of similarity in exports does not guarantee a sub-
percentages). Where both countries’ trade structures correspond perfectly, ESI=100, and in 
zero correspondence, ESI= -100.
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stituting relationship. Suppose a horizontal division of labor proceeded between 
Japan and China. For example, if Japan had an advantage and competitive 
export strength in large household electrical appliances, and China had an 
advantage in small household electrical appliances, it would be possible to 
see a substituting relationship progressing despite a high level of similarity 
in the exports of both countries. On the other hand, if Japan exported 
components for household electrical appliances and China exported finished 
products, the components and the finished products would be complementary, 
and so it could be determined that there are strong complementarities
between these two countries from the point of view of a vertical division of labor 
despite the high level of similarity in export structure. Thus, a high similarity 
index in the exports of household electrical appliances can be interpreted as 
indicating both a substituting relationship and a complementary relationship, 
and the conclusion would depend on what SITC level was used to measure the 
similarity.
What can be said about the complementarities between Japanese and Chinese 
trade from the level of similarity of the countries’ export structures to the world 
is extremely limited. Then, take a look at the similarity between the export 
structures of the two countries limited to just Sino-Japanese trade. Due to the 
availability of data, it is only possible to compare the 20-year period starting in 
1990, while excluding resource-intensive industries such as petroleum and gas 
where the export products of the two countries is completely different, and further 
excluding labor-intensive industries such as foods and textiles in which China 
has an overwhelming advantage. The calculation of the similarity index was 
limited to the industries of steel and iron, chemicals and machinery, in which the 
complementary/substituting relationship within the industries is relatively clear.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Chemicals 95.42 95.64 92.08 93.67 95.47
Iron and steel, 
Nonferrous metals 90.80 94.89 94.61 96.34 95.71
General machinery 87.15 80.29 89.95 98.76 97.60
Electrical machinery 82.53 90.02 86.36 89.94 96.28
Household electric 
appliances 99.48 99.46 97.56 95.36 92.88
Precision machinery 99.12 98.73 98.48 96.55 96.24
Transportation 
Equipment 92.36 98.77 98.02 97.67 93.83
Total 46.87 57.79 61.94 77.57 82.25
Table 8: Export Similarity Index for Sino-Japanese Trade (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on RIETI-TID 2011 data
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The following conclusion seems derivable from Table 8. First, the entire export 
structure from each country to the other is becoming progressively similar. This 
movement indicates that China is also exporting to Japan what Japan is exporting 
to China, in other words, Japan started importing the similar sorts of products from 
China. Rather than a substituting, competitive relationship between the markets 
of both countries proceeding, a complementary relationship is developing in these 
industries. As is implied by the first type of the flying geese pattern, it is generally 
uncommon that the exactly same goods could be imported as are exported.27 
This trend is seen specially in general machinery and electrical machinery, and it 
suggests that Japan’s investment in China was quite active in these areas. On the 
other hand, in steel and iron and chemicals, as well as in transport equipment and 
precision machinery, the similarity index of exports by each country to the other 
was high at the outset, with no major changes observed over the 20-year period. 
This is likely a result of an intrinsic segregation in these sectors, in which the 
competitive relationship between the products of both countries was weak.
In order to further investigate this point, let us analyze the structure and 
changes of the export products with respect to steel and iron, which had a high 
export similarity index (see Table 9). 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Primary goods 93.66 99.86 97.92 91.01 90.74
Processed goods 92.22 95.78 89.16 98.73 99.04
Capital goods 99.79 99.90 97.78 98.51 98.65
Consumption goods 99.04 95.60 89.99 92.40 92.13
Parts and components 99.73 99.58 99.31 98.62 99.09
Total 84.45 90.72 74.16 79.26 79.65
Table 9: Export Similarity Index for Sino-Japanese Iron and
Steel Trade (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on RIETI-TID 2011 data
The export products are divided into primary goods, processed goods, capital 
goods, consumption goods, and parts and components. Among these, the similarity 
index barely budged for capital goods or for parts and components over the 20-
year period of inquiry, and for the other categories, the similarity index has been 
27 Certainly, depending on time and price, it is possible that two countries will import and 
export the same type of good in the same year. For example, Japan may happen to import 
the same goods that it has usually exportd to China when its domestic demand for the goods 
cannot be satisfied by local production. However, because import-export is by nature doing 
business with the international competitive market, when price conditions, quality and other 
factors are similar, it is uncommon for same goods to be imported and exported at the same 
time.
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decreasing.28 Overall, the level of similarity between Japan and China in steel and 
iron exports has decreased slightly, and with detailed research on this reserved 
for the future, it seems there is a trend towards stronger complementarities in 
the steel and iron trade between the two countries. To put it another way, a likely 
interpretation probably is as follows; while the level of export similarity between 
the two countries in the iron and steel industry as a whole is high, its internal 
structure of exports is becoming progressively more different to the extent that 
complementarity is strengthening.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Primary 
goods -35,620,186 47,434,528 174,292,526 1,226,392,919 2,159,329,093
Processed
goods 982,243,736 1,756,794,625 2,415,598,894 4,185,711,049 10,405,064,013
Capital goods 3,087,854 12,596,277 -41,289,560 -73,654,359 -58,349,920
Consumption 
goods -788,202 -93,125,324 -222,902,844 -483,984,850 -638,213,103
Parts & 
components 2,173,363 29,751,781 24,680,368 309,501,912 522,259,962
Total 951,096,565 1,753,451,887 2,350,379,384 5,163,966,671 12,390,090,045
Table 10: Japan's Net Export of Iron and Steel to China (yen)
Source: Author’s calculation based on RIETI-TID 2011 data
However, the similarity index is not only a benchmark for observing relative 
relationships. Then, net exports within steel and iron exports/imports between the 
two countries will be examined (see Table 10). 
In terms of total value, Japan’s trade surplus has been expanding, but most of 
this has been due to semi-finished product exports. On the other hand, Japan is a 
net importer of consumption goods, indicating that China is gaining competitive 
strength in this direction. In the realm of capital goods as well, Japan was once 
a net exporter but has recently become a net importer. This shift also signifies 
China’s increasing competitive strength, with a substituting relationship starting to 
develop between Japan and China.
In other words, with industry as a whole strengthening and maintaining its 
complementarity, there are areas at the level of individual products in which 
substituting and competitive relationships are increasing. This tendency may 
serve as indication that Sino-Japanese trade is developing in a complicated 
complementary/substituting relationship.
28 Because the nature of the similarity index described here differs somewhat from the index 
above, it is dictated by the proportion of various iron and steel products to the total amount of 
iron and steel exports.
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5. Asymmetry in Investment and Technology
In the case of trade, a competitive (substituting) relationship is strengthening 
between Japan and China, but in investment and technology, a complementary, 
or rather a unidirectional relationship, is continuing. Namely, Japan is the side 
making transfers, and China is the side being transferred to in this case. As stated 
above, China’s investment in Japan is gradually growing, but it cannot compare 
in size to Japan’s investment in China. When it comes to technology, Japan has an 
overwhelming excess in exports to China.
Nevertheles, this trend is not expected to continue into the future. China’s 
economy which stood at only one-fourth the size of Japan’s in the year 2000, 
grew so rapidly that it surpassed Japan in 2010. If China continues to grow at 
this rate over the next 10 years, it is plausible that investment in Japan would 
skyrocket as China’s technological progress advances to the point of outstripping 
South Korea and Taiwan. One barometer for this may be found in a comparison 
of the number of approved patent applications submitted to the US Patent and 
Trademark Office by country/region of Asia. 
As is clear in Table 11, Japan holds the top position in Asia by far, but South 
Korea is swiftly rising upwards. China is far below South Korea and Taiwan, but 
looking at growth rate, it is expected to surpass Taiwan in less than five years. 
Further, if the flying geese pattern of development applies to technology as well, 
it is conceivable that China, racing from behind, will have already passed the 
ASEAN countries and be rapidly closing in on Taiwan.
1995 2000 2005 2010 2010/1995
Japan 21764 31295 30341 44814 2.06
Korea 1161 3314 4352 11671 10.05
Taiwan 1620 4667 5118 8238 5.09
Hong Kong 86 179 283 429 4.99
Singapore 53 218 346 603 11.38
Indonesia 4 6 10 6 1.50
The Philippines 4 2 18 37 9.25
Malaysia 7 42 88 202 28.86
Thailand 8 15 16 46 5.75
China 62 119 402 2657 42.85
Table 11: Number of US Patents Granted as Distributed by Year 
of Patent Grant 
Source: US Patent and Trademark Office (December 2011) at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ ido/oeip/taf/cst_utl.pdf
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Of course, the level of technology cannot be represented by patents alone. 
Also, the number of patent applications in the US does not represent the entirety 
of patent application ability. However, even if another indicator with a deep 
connection to the level of technology were to be introduced—for example, the 
number of patent applications in other advanced countries aside from the US, 
the total number of engineers in the country, the number of graduates from 
departments of science and engineering, or the number of technical research 
centers—it is certain that such measures of China’s latent ability would not 
downgrade China’s status in technological level.
Compared to China, where the technology to design and produce high speed 
trains was introduced or copied from Japan and Germany, and sophisticated 
technology to reach the international standard was learned within a short period 
of time, the higher income countries like Malaysia, Thailand, etc., and even the 
advanced country of Singapore do not have China’s level of technical ability. Of 
course, the population scales of these countries differ, and so it may be that this 
simple comparison of countries’ technological levels is not appropriate. However, 
in China’s case, it is not just that there is a large population; the technological 
accumulation since the Maoist era, as well as the powerful policy of using foreign 
capital to bring in advanced technology, have been crucial.
It can be understood from comparing the history of the development of 
automobile industries in Taiwan and China that technological level and speed 
of advancement are not simply determined by the income level of a country. 
Namely, Taiwan has been striving to nurture its own automobile industry for many 
years but is without any completely homegrown companies, all of them existing 
under the umbrella of Japanese and American automobile capital. However, in 
China there are companies such as Qirui, which was founded in 1997 and has 
now grown to the point of exporting automobiles with its own brand, and there 
is Geely, which acquired the powerful brand Volvo and is attempting to gain 
technological strength. In searching for the background behind why this “reversal 
phenomenon” occurred between China and Taiwan, one arrives at the differences 
in government policies and a disparity in technology accumulation strength, 
as mentioned above. In China, the state is central and served as an actor in a 
financial role in the development of the automobile industry, whereas Taiwan’s 
actors were small-scale private firms. What is important, though, is that it is not 
the fact that they were state-owned that the corporations became large and were 
able to develop. If the arrangement were such that a state-owned corporation 
monopolized the automobile industry during the Maoist era, there would not have 
been such rapid development in the automobile industry. It was the competition 
among state-owned enterprise and creation of ties to foreign capital along with the 
allowance of participation by private companies that the dynamic strength within 
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the development of China’s automobile industry arose. 
With respect to the technological level, there is a very large gap between 
Japan and China, as indicated by the figures in Table 11, and it will not be easy 
for China to catch up with Japan. However, as seen in China’s leap-frogging 
development in trade, there is a thorough possibility that the same phenomenon is 
partially occurring in technology as well. For example, China has already gained 
a global share in the production of solar panels and is making new research and 
development investments in that direction. Although China is still currently at the 
stage of increasing its global share through mass production, relying on low-wage 
labor and using low cost as a weapon, it is not impossible that the technology 
for solar panels of higher quality and lower cost than those from Japan will arise 
in China and sweep the globe. This is reminiscent of South Korea’s Samsung, 
which succeeded in developing scaling-up technology that still surpasses that of 
Japanese companies in the organic EL television business, in which Sony had 
originally succeeded in development and commercialization. Technology is not 
only created in countries with high income and then transferred to lower income 
countries in such a way as Figure 1 indicates. We must not forget that China has 
been rapidly gaining strength in technological development, behind which lies the 
strong tailwind provided by the state, and that there is intense market competition 
between numerous private corporations. 
Conclusion: From a Complementary to
   a Competitive Complementary Relationship
It was approximately ten years ago that the majority came to view the economic 
relationship between Japan and China not as the competitive, substituting 
relationship proposed in the “China threat” argument, but as a completely 
complementary relationship. However, it seems that these optimistic views must 
be re-examined. A correction must be made to the traditional, commonly-held view 
that, as the flying geese pattern theory and the theory of catch-up industrialization 
suggest, there is a hierarchy in comparative advantage and technological level 
that is in accordance with a country’s stage of economic development, and that 
even if the gap between countries shrinks due to differing speeds of development, 
a less-advanced country would never leapfrog an advanced country. There is 
indeed a clear difference in comparative advantage and a huge technological gap 
between Japan and China. Consequently, this is not to say that the FGP theory 
and the theory of catch-up industrialization have become completely obsolete. 
These models remain valid basically for understanding the development pattern of 
China. The point is that these models do not completely explain phenomena that 
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are appearing more and more in a variety of industries and areas.
Now that China has developed economically, increased its technological level 
and enabled diverse industries, the economic relationship between Japan and 
China cannot be completely complementary. Much as the FGP pattern theory 
has partially collapsed, trade between Japan and China has also progressively 
expanded into substituting and competitive areas. In the past, Japanese enterprises 
were entirely reluctant to extend advanced technology to China in fear of a 
boomerang effect, but a situation is arising in which China has either developed 
that technology itself or imported it from countries other than Japan, rendering 
Japan unable to be the country to sell it to China. Faced with this fact, Japanese 
enterprises must determine, in extending technology and making investment 
decisions, what to yield to China, when to compete with China, and where to 
cooperate with China.
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